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Resumo: Este texto examina o 
envolvimento crucial das grandes 
potências na identificação e 
exploração de recursos naturais 
e humanos no estratégico Golfo 
da Guiné localizado na África. Por 
variadas razões, tal intervenção 
produziu esferas de influência 
hegemônica e confrontos 
neocoloniais de vários tipos. 
A guerra de palavras e outras 
práticas pouco ortodoxas iniciadas 
por esses poderes e apoiadas por 
alguns de seus representantes 
africanos desencadeou uma 
crescente mobilização de 
organizações da sociedade civil.
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major powers in the identification 
and exploitation of natural and 
human resources in the strategically 
located Gulf of Guinea, in Africa. For 
multifarious reasons, this intervention 
has produced spheres of hegemonic 
influence and neo-colonial clashes of 
various kinds. The war of words and 
other unorthodox practices initiated by 
these powers and supported by some 
African surrogates has unleashed a 
growing mobilisation of civil society 
organisations. 
Keywords: Africa; Gulf of Guinea; 
Neocolonialism; Civil Society.
RECEBIDO EM: 05 DE AGOSTO DE 2015
APROVADO EM: 10 DE SETEMBRO DE 2015
HENRY KAM KAH
Professor da Universidade de Buea, 
Camarões.
ndangso@yahoo.com
HENRY KAM KAH
204  |  TENSÕES MUNDIAIS, FORTALEZA, V. 12, N. 22, P. 203-226, 2016
1 INTRODUCTION: MOMENTOUS ISSUES AND ACTORS IN 
THE GULF OF GUINEA
The greater Gulf of Guinea with an area of nearly 3500 miles 
of coastline is one of the strategic regions of Africa which is also 
blessed with a variety of natural resources such as oil, gas, diverse 
minerals and human resources. There is a heavy concentration 
of oil and gas reserves in the region including also North Africa. 
Its market size is about 300 million consumers. The countries 
of this region include Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Chad, Central African Republic and Togo (IBIKUNLE et alli, 2010; 
HALLESON, 2009a; ONUOHA, 2010). The countries are a mix of 
English, Portuguese and French speaking. Other attractions of 
the Gulf of Guinea include its relative closeness to the energy 
consuming countries of North America and Western Europe. The 
geographical closeness of the region to Western Europe relative to 
the Middle East and Asia makes it to have a comparative advantage 
in the movement of goods and people by way of a reduced cost of 
sea transportation (IBIKUNLE et alli, 2010; ONUOHA, 2010).
The presence of resources like oil, gas, gold, manganese, 
timber and fish has created a deep seated disgruntlement among 
a majority of the inhabitants of countries of the Gulf of Guinea. 
Revenue from these resources hardly trickles down to the common 
people. The wealth so obtained is used to prop up dictators in 
several countries of the region through civil war and other forms 
of repression as was witnessed in Angola during the long drawn 
out war between the MPLA and UNITA in Angola from 1975-
1991 and 1992-2002 (HALLESON, 2009b). Oil notwithstanding, 
there is a high rate of unemployment, environmental pollution 
and degradation as well as armed attacks like in the Niger Delta, 
Bakassi peninsular and piracy which is causing sleepless nights to 
the national security services of member countries of the Gulf of 
Guinea. Piracy has recently made the waters of the Gulf of Guinea 
unsafe for navigation by large sea-going vessels from Asia, Europe 
and the United States.
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The degree of inter-state strife in the Gulf of Guinea is 
alarming. At one time or the other, the DRC received support from 
Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad and also from Sudanese 
and Rwandan Hutu extremist groups in its struggle to suppress 
internal dissent. Between 1998 and 2003, the northern part of the 
DRC was taken hostage by Ugandan troops which also controlled 
gold rich areas and forced gold miners to extract the gold for 
their benefits. They looted Congolese gold valued over 9 million 
(HALLESON, 2009b). Within the Republic of Congo there have 
also been scuffles between warring factions over the gains of oil. 
The greater consequence of internal bickering was the split along 
ethno-regional lines and the establishment of three prominent 
militias which included the Cocoyes of Pascal Lissouba, Cobras of 
Denis SassouNguesso and the Ninjas of Kolela.  Such a complex 
situation was further compounded by the support of the Cobras by 
Angola which helped them to secure Brazzaville and Pointe Noire 
(HALLESON, 2009b). There is generally a high circulation of small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region (ONUOHA, 2010). 
This is a result of the struggle to control resources for the benefit 
of a very limited few.
Other major problems of the Gulf of Guinea include piracy, 
maritime disputes, a negative governance balance sheet, weak 
state structures, absence of accountability, environmental spillage, 
pipeline vandalism, the absence of a sound infrastructure, non 
viable legal institutions, and ethnic clashes among others. A few 
years ago, piracy was a rampant occurrence in the Horn of Africa 
and not the Gulf of Guinea but in the past few years, the waters 
of the Gulf of Guinea are among the most unsafe for sea going 
vessels. The region between Cotonnou in Benin and Nigeria has 
witnessed an upsurge in the number of pirate attacks recently. 
Since the coastline is craggy, it offers a variety of hiding places for 
potential attackers.
The problems of governance, the environment, infrastructure, 
poverty, insecurity, weakinstitutions, volatility of world oil prices 
and currencies of trade, climate change, transnational criminality, 
protracted separatist insurgent conflicts, countless attempted 
coups, unconstitutional change of government, mismanagement 
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of electoral processes, drug trafficking, terrorism, maritime 
piracy, illiteracy and environmental degradation (SOUARÉ, 2010; 
GOLDWYN; MORRISON, 2005; PHAM, 2007; GILPIN, 2007; MANE, 
2004; PLOCH, 2010; OYERANMI, 2011; HALL, 2011; EDO, 2010; 
BOADUO FRC, 2010) have created tension between government 
officials who feed fat on oil money and the poor masses who have 
had to pay the price of being located in areas of oil exploitation.
Most countries of the Gulf of Guinea have potentials or huge 
reserves of oil, gas and minerals. The entire region is one of 
the most promising oil exploration areas of the world and it is 
estimated that by 2020 the energy potentials of the region will 
surpass the total production of the Persian Gulf nations with 
25% of global production as against 22% for the Persian Gulf 
(HALLESON, 2009a). Angola which is richly endowed with oil and 
diamond is the second largest oil producer in the Gulf of Guinea 
after Nigeria and the fourth world’s largest producer of diamond 
having estimated reserves of about 180 million carats (HALLESON, 
2009a).  In Cameroon, the mining sector offers huge potentials 
and at the moment, the country is the sixth largest oil exporter 
in Africa (HALLESON, 2009a). For Nigeria, she is the largest 
producer of crude oil and she also has huge reserves of natural gas 
estimated at about 184 trillion cubic feet. She is the eighth largest 
oil exporting country in the world (HALLESON, 2009a; OYERANMI, 
2011). The economy of the Republic of Congo relies heavily on 
oil and the country is the fifth largest oil producer in sub-Saharan 
Africa (HALLESON, 2009a). Gabon is amongst sub-Saharan 
Africa’s biggest oil producer and its economy like that of Congo is 
dependent on oil production (HALLESON, 2009a). She is the third 
largest producer of manganese and holds a quarter of the world’s 
known reserves (see: <www.estandardsforum.org>).
Other countries of the Gulf of Guinea like the DRC are also 
great producers of oil. Newcomers into the petroleum business 
include Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and the 
CAR. Following the discovery and exploitation of oil in Equatorial 
Guinea, she is now the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan 
Africa after Nigeria and Angola. The CAR is the seventh largest 
producer of diamond in Africa and is tenth largest producer in the 
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world (HALLESON, 2009a). Sao Tome and Principe has hope for 
the benefits of oil in the same measure like other countries of the 
Gulf of Guinea. The richness of the resource potentials of the Gulf 
of Guinea is glaring as Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea have 
increased their production potentials to the extent that they are 
leading producers of oil not only in the Gulf of Guinea and Africa 
but the world. Behind these rich energy potentials are hegemonic 
activities within and between countries.
2 CONCEPTUALISING HEGEMONY 
The concept of hegemony or a hegemon is applicable in everyday 
interaction of people, societies and countries. This is especially so 
because of the quest for power, political dominance and influence 
in a world governed by the maxim of the survival of the fittest. 
Different authors have examined this concept empirically in 
relation to their experiences in different societies of the world. The 
concept was first developed by Gramsci who attempted to explain 
how a state managed to assert its power over a population living 
in a given territory. Gramsci argued that the means of repression at 
the disposal of a state were the most visible element of its power. 
He also highlighted what he called the ‘war of position’ which is 
often pursued by competitors in a subtle and non-violent manner.
Meanwhile, Doyle argues that hegemony takes place when a 
metropole controls much or all of the external but not the internal 
policy of other states (DOYLE, 1986). Wallerstein (2002) enlivens 
the debate further arguing that hegemony is a situation where one 
state succeeds to impose its set of rules on the interstate system 
leading to a temporal creation of a new political order.
In addition, Simon’s perception of hegemony is tested on a social 
group. According to him, a social group can become dominant 
and gather state power in its hands only if this group succeeds 
in developing its hegemony within the civil society through 
persuasion of subordinate groups to accept the values and ideas 
that it has adopted and by also building a network of alliances based 
on these values (SIMON, 1991). In addition, Keohane’s discussion 
(1989) about hegemon centres on the one that is powerful enough 
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to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and 
willing to do so. He contends that the theory of hegemonic stability 
has two central propositions. Firstly, the order in world politics 
is typically created by a single dominant power which implies 
that the formation of international regimes normally depends 
on hegemony. Secondly, he posits that the maintenance of order 
requires continued hegemony which suggests that cooperation 
also depends on the perpetuation of hegemony (KEOHANE, 1989).
From these discussions about what hegemony is and/or is not, 
it is clear that although the authors are not agreed on a common 
perception of the concept, there is however convergence of 
views. This has to do with the ability to manipulate or lead others 
partially or wholly with the aim of reaping maximum benefit from 
such action. While the exercise of hegemony is not limited to 
different social classes, groups or within countries, it embraces the 
international arena especially as far as the struggle for the control 
of geographical regions and resources are concerned. As far as the 
Gulf of Guinea is concerned, several western countries notably the 
United States, Britain, France, and China have each tussled at one 
time or the other for exclusive spheres of influence for their natural 
and human resources. Such a tussle can be conveniently described 
as competing hegemonies over a strategic region of the world and 
the abundance of resources found therein.
3 HEGEMONIC RIVALRY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
The Gulf of Guinea in time and space has witnessed the arrival 
and departure of different powers depending on who had influence 
over the world at any given time. The first countries to have sailed 
to this region were Portugal and Spain. This followed advances 
they had made in the voyages of discovery in the 15th century. 
Thereafter other countries like Holland, Prussia, England, France 
and Sweden made their presence felt during the over four centuries 
of the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. They were in competition with 
one another and from time to time the different forts constructed 
along the West African coast to facilitate the slave trade were 
controlled by one country or the other. This was more or less the 
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beginning of hegemonic competition in this region of Africa. During 
the scramble for Africa in the last quarter of the 19th century, most 
of the Gulf of Guinea came under the control of Britain and France 
including also Spain and Portugal in Equatorial Guinea and Cape 
Verde and Guinea Bissau respectively. For a long time, the British 
and French carved out hegemonic spheres of influence after their 
merchants clashed in several trading areas of this regionespecially 
around the Niger Delta region. This did not last for long as after 
the Second World War, the United States of America emerged 
as a powerful player in geo-politics in the world. The eventual 
emergence of China and then other third world countries like India 
and Brazil including also Japan led to another wave of the scramble 
for Africa and especially the geo-strategic Gulf of Guinea. This was 
also facilitated by the fact that the Middle East that use to provide 
most of the energy needs of the capitalist countries became a 
dangerous zone to rely on if these super-powers were to continue 
to expand their industrial bases and increase their demand for 
sustained supply of energy.
The major players in the Gulf of Guinea today include America, 
China, India, Britain and France. Other European and Asian coun-
tries have been occasionally felt in some sectors and countries of 
the Gulf of Guinea in the mad rush for the numerous natural endo-
wments of the region. These countries include but are not limited 
to Japan, Malaysia, Germany, Brazil, Belgium, Switzerland, Russia, 
India, Netherlands, Pakistan, South Korea and North Korea. Within 
the region, some countries have preyed on others for the control of 
their resources such as Rwanda’s and Uganda’s support for insur-
gent groups in the DRC in exchange of control for gold, diamond 
and other precious minerals and Nigeria’s  control of large oil 
reserves which are within the territorial confines of Sao Tome and 
Principe. This is a clear indication of the fact that while there is 
external hegemonic competition over the Gulf of Guinea and its 
resources, there are also hegemonic activities within this region 
orchestrated by some states over others. Such has only compou-
nded an already volatile situation for the entire region, its natural 
resources and people.
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The competition for control of resources and countries of the 
Gulf of Guinea is informed by the official policies of China and 
the United States of Africa. China’s Africa strategy is generally to 
invest in its resources and to create jobs to stave off the country’s 
permanent unemployment crisis. This is facilitated by the Exim 
Bank which offers strategic overseas investors an interest discou-
nt (BOSSHARD, 2008). Officially, China wants to build solidarity 
with African governments, present itself as a reliable interlocutor 
between developing countries and the developed West. She also 
pledges large amounts of aid and investments in Africa’s infras-
tructure and other sectors with no political strings attached, except 
a withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (The Impact of 
the Chinese, 2). This giant in Asia is also concerned about a “return 
to global multi-polarity in which milieu Africa and the developing 
countries will have a greater role on the global stage than they 
currently do” (LE PERE, 2007, p. 06). China has also made use of 
‘soft power’ and ‘oil-for-arms deals’ to win oil concessions in the 
Gulf of Guinea. This and other measures have been taken by the 
Chinese government to counter US antics in the Gulf of Guinea 
(ONUOHA, 2010).
On the other hand, the official policy of the United States 
towards Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in particular has been stated 
again and again over the years. America’s concerns in the Gulf of 
Guinea are informed by the need to manage security and also to 
do ‘ring fencing’ so that Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, can 
secure the energy needs of the United States of America. During 
Obama’s campaign for the presidency of the US he had as one of 
his key policy objective towards Africa, the restoration of American 
leadership in the world. He pledged to continue a struggle to reclaim 
and guarantee US imperial hegemony in a world that had grown 
increasingly hostile to American domination. America is really 
concerned about the domination of the world and its resources 
(BANGURA, 2010).  In short, China, America and other Western 
countries are absolutely concerned with control over Africa and 
its human and material resources (ALEMAZUNG, 2010). This is 
where the Gulf of Guinea with an abundance of these resources 
has been ‘invaded’ in a sort of ‘resource war’ for the benefit of 
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those industrialised and technologically advanced countries and 
other emerging countries of Latin America and Asia.
The race for control of large resource reserves in the Gulf of 
Guinea is largely between America and China and from time to 
time France and Britain as well. China has since the turn of the 
21st century established a stranglehold over Angola and has also 
made significant in routes into Gabon, Nigeria and Cameroon in 
diverse fields of economic activities. China’s link with Angola, the 
second largest oil producer in sub Saharan Africa and owner of 
promising oil reserves has since 2003 taken the form of extended 
large concessional loans. This has made China to since 2006 
overtake the US as the major trading partner of Angola. Prior to 
this year, the US had been Angola’s major trading partner for 
most of modern history (ALVES, 2010). In concrete terms, in 2008 
Angola’s imports from China was worth 14.8% but from America 
and France her imports was only 12.4% and 4.2% respectively.  Her 
exports on the other hand to China worth 33.5% surpassed those of 
America, France, Canada and the Netherlands worth 27.3%, 5.7%, 
3.9% and 3.4% respectively (ECONOMIST…, 2009).
Chinese hegemonic activities are also felt in other economically 
rewarding sectors of some countries of the Gulf of Guinea. In the 
DRC, she has a great influence in the mining sector and she is 
increasing her investments in cobalt and copper mines there as 
well (ALVES, 2010; The Impact of the Chinese, 12). Meanwhile in 
2004 following the visit of the Chinese President to Gabon, three 
on shore licences for the exploration of oil were awarded to a 
Chinese oil company UNIPEC, a subsidiary of SINOPEC. Two years 
later, the Gabonese government granted a Chinese consortium, 
headed by the China National Machinery and Equipment Import 
and Export Company (CMEC) sole rights to mine for iron ore at 
Belinga and build a rail link to reach the deposits in an area covered 
by a tropical forest situated 500km east of Libreville (COUNTRY…, 
2010). In the present dispensation, China has increasing stakes 
in oil in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria thereby invading 
territories which once were predominantly under the control of 
America, the EU and France. Prior to July 2005 when China and 
Nigeria signed an $800 million crude oil sale agreement which set 
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in motion an annual purchase by China of 30,000 barrels a day for 
five years, American, British and French oil companies enjoyed a 
virtual dominance of Nigeria’s oil industry. In order to effectively 
compete in Nigeria with other western powers, China has also 
won a licence to operate four of Nigeria’s oil blocs. This is part of 
an incentive to build a hydropower station and other agreements 
(ONUOHA, 2010).
The Chinese are also playing a central role in the retail sector 
in Gabon and Cameroon (ALVES, 2010). In the forestry sector in 
Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Congo, the Chinese 
are competing in the felling of trees for timber. This is shipped 
to some of China’s state owned sawmills in places like Sichuan. 
Meanwhile in Nigeria and Ghana, China’s insatiable demand for 
minerals opened up new markets for their own products (ALDEN, 
2007). The forestry sector is however a free for all fight in the Gulf 
of Guinea considering the number of countries concerned with 
logging and transportation of timber to their own countries. In 
Gabon for example, the foreign firms engaged in logging include 
Thanry and Rougier from France, RimbunanHijau from Malaysia 
and Glunz from Germany (COUNTRY…, 2010).
As a counter to Chinese presence and control of vital sectors 
of the Gulf of Guinea, America has carved out exclusive spheres of 
influence. This has been done by stepping up its military presen-
ce in the Gulf of Guinea through increased visits and the esta-
blishment of the African Command (AFRICOM) since 2007. The 
US offers military assistance to the Nigerian military to enhance 
its capacity to protect the oil industry and also secure the stra-
tegic and energy needs of America in this area. The donation of 
the US Coast Guard NNS THUNDER to the Nigerian Navy was also 
intended to serve US strategic interests in the region.(ONUOHA, 
2010; NDLOVU-GATSHENI; OJAKOROTU, 2010; UNITED…, 2011). 
In Equatorial Guinea, American ExxonMobil, US Marathon and 
others have invested over US $3 Billion.1
This intimidating presence in a country of a little over 500,000 
people is a way to secure a permanent foothold on the oil resources 
1  See McCullum (2006a; 2006b).
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of Equatorial Guinea and also effectively control the Bight of Biafra 
and Benin, all located within the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, the US 
is paying for a new airport in Sao Tome which will be able to take 
the biggest military aircraft. She is also in the process of developing 
a deep sea port large enough for its warships. All these have been 
facilitated by the treaty the US has signed making Sao Tome a stra-
tegic regional base within the next ten years to provide large amou-
nts of oil to the US.2  American role in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline 
project was also crucial towards the promotion of American ener-
gy needs in the long term. In Cameroon, an exploitation permit has 
been attributed to a US based company GEOVIC Cameroon SA to 
exploit cobalt and nickel in the East Region (HALLESON, 2009a). 
Through all these, America has strategically positioned itself in the 
Gulf of Guinea to checkmate the excesses of the Chinese and other 
emerging countries like India and Brazil in the region.
Apart from the US and China, other countries are in competition 
for resources in Africa’s Gulf of Guinea.  In the forestry sector in 
Gabon the Malaysian Rimbunan Hijau, French Thanry and Rougier 
and German Glunz are in competition with others for forest exploi-
tation. Meanwhile in the mining of uranium and manganese, the 
French firm of Areva and Eramet, Brazilian Vale are in compe-
tition. On the other hand, over 33 companies from Germany, 
Belgium, Rwanda, Malaysia, Tanzania, Switzerland, Russia, India, 
the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Pakistan are engaged in the 
importation of minerals from the DRC through Rwanda.The South 
Korean National Oil Corporation recently obtained 65% oil and 
gas production rights in two Nigerian off-shore blocs (HALLESON, 
2009a; ONUOHA, 2010). What obtains therefore is a situation 
where the fittest survive over the weak in the struggle for resource 
control in the greater Gulf of Guinea area. As different contending 
powers try to have an edge over each other, they do everything to 
ensure that their local allies gain political power usually by unfair 
methods (TIMAH, 2007). Those who emerge as leaders have often 
served the interests of those countries that supported them in the 
rigging of elections and bother very little about their own citizens.
2  See McCullum (2006a; 2006b).
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Although the EU was the first to assemble most of the early 
oil companies to tap black gold from the Gulf of Guinea, it now 
trails behind Asia as the third largest destination of West African 
oil. The entire EU receives about 7.1% of its oil from the Gulf of 
Guinea. Among the EU oil majors operating in the Gulf of Guinea 
are British Petroleum (BP), Total and Agip. In Nigeria, the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) accounts for roughly 
half of Nigeria’s oil production (ONUOHA, 2010). In spite of the 
presence of oil majors from the EU in the oil sector in the Gulf 
of Guinea, China including other countries of Asia like Malaysia, 
India and South Korea and the US have a greater hegemonic 
influence in this region today than member countries of the EU. 
This only confirms the saying that the first shall be the last and the 
last the first. While the French are among the most active of the 
EU member states in the region, Britain and Germany are still to 
be very actively seen when compared to the other countries of this 
region of resource abundance.
The hegemonic competition in the Gulf of Guinea also involves 
some countries of the region or neighbouring countries to those of 
this region. Between 1998 and 2003 in Northern DRC, Ugandan troops 
took direct control of gold rich areas and forced gold miners to extract 
the gold for their benefit. They also looted Congolese gold which 
was valued at over $9 million (HALLESON, 2009a). Nigeria on the 
other hand has been in conflict with Sao Tome and Principe over oil 
reserves and now controls most of the oil of this island (MCCULLUM, 
2006a; 2006b). These are simple examples of hegemonic activities 
within the Gulf of Guinea which have created tension between some 
countries. This has been fully exploited by the US and other western 
powers for their own security and other strategic interests. Until 
there is synergy between countries of this region for their collective 
good and survival, the resources of the region like other regions will 
remain a curse rather than a blessing. The existing fragmentation in 
energy and other issues is what the western countries want because it 
makes it essay for them to sign favourable treaties for the exploration 
and exploitation of oil. It is against this background that a viable civil 
society will serve a very useful purpose for the collective good of the 
people of the Gulf of Guinea.
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4 ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS (CSOS)
Following the intense activities of the super-powers in the Gulf 
of Guinea today, the civil society is expected to play a very impor-
tant role to regulate their activities and ensure that these activities 
benefit a broad spectrum of society. The problems of the region 
which include bad governance, corruption, poor legal and adminis-
trative frameworks and environmental pollution calls for the civil 
society to play an important role in correcting these evils (LE PERE, 
2007). In fact, a common African response is more likely at the level 
of the civil society where in spite of differences; there is often more 
mutuality of concerns about human rights, democracy, labour and 
trade issues (MANJI; MARKS, 2007). Ndika contends that the short-
comings of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) notwithstanding, 
they have been able to take advantage of a structured format for 
engaging governmentsin order to hold them accountable for how 
and where oil money is spent.  The civil society is expected to live 
up to the responsibility of ensuring proper governance of Nigeria’s 
oil resource, not only by monitoring the activities of multinational 
oil companies, but also by ensuring that governments at all levels 
fulfil their part of the social contract with the people to whom oil 
should bringing enduring benefits.3  This takes place at this point in 
time when there are reports that the civil society is still weak and 
lacks the information and resources to hold governments of the 
Gulf of Guinea accountable for their actions.4 
In the Gulf of Guinea, the civil society has on several occasions 
lashed out at injustice, discrimination and exploitation even if 
these measures have not yet yielded very positive significant fruits. 
Arsene Guelélé of the Action for the Environment and International 
Solidarity, a Congolese Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
recently argued that some five or six years ago the Chinese 
fishermen caught fish in the Atlantic Ocean without respecting 
even fish fry which made them fear that fish may no longer be 
found in the waters for the Congolese people. Another civil society 
activist Donatien Animiyo of the Fishermen’s Group of Mpila 
3  See Garuba (2006)
4  See McCullum (2006a; 2006b).
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condemned the use of explosive devices at the end of the civil war 
in 1997 because it destroyed the ecosystem and prevented fish 
from reproducing. The consequence was the scarcity of fish in the 
market. The reaction of both civil society activists clearly indicated 
that there were internal hegemonic activities of different groups in 
the Congo. This was in response to the Chinese exploitation of fish 
resources which would create additional problems in the future if 
measures were not immediately taken to checkmate these.
The civil society in Chad also raised its voice on issues around 
the Chad-Cameroon pipeline but the World Bank did not beacon 
to their call. It demanded for a delay in the financing of the project 
until the emergence of a responsive political order that would 
ensure that Chad’s oil wealth was sustainably managed. Similarly, 
the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) in 
collaboration with a coalition of a civil society the Publish What 
You Pay (PWYP) have argued that to tame the curse of oil, Nigeria 
must begin to make better developmental use of the huge reve-
nue accruing from oil.5 Other civil society groups in Nigeria’s oil 
and gas region under the banner of the Niger Delta Civil Society 
Coalition (NDCSC) are very concerned about the Gulf of Guinea 
Energy Security Strategy (GUESS) which is leaving issues of peace 
and security as they relate to the oil region to the state alone 
with no private initiative added to it. This organisation of over 80 
community-based, human rights, women’s human rights, mino-
rity/ethnic movements and professional organisations work in the 
core geographical area of the Delta region. 
According to the Chairman of this umbrella organisation, “the 
NDCSC is very concerned that GUESS is leaving issues of peace 
and security as it relates to Nigeria and the Niger Delta region in 
particular, to the state alone.” This organisation is also concerned 
about the protection of national borders, prevention of inter-state 
conflict, security, peace, protection of the environment and the 
improvement of the quality of life of the local people. The NDCSC 
strongly maintains that the main source of insecurity in the Gulf of 
Guinea today are the unelected power holders and the activities 
5  See Garuba (2006)
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of the oil majors and calls on GUESS to urgently provide action 
space for civil society participation in its security processes. 
Effective networking by civil society groups will adequately secure 
support for new oil societies within GUESS areas that have yet to 
experience resource curse to learn first-hand from the experience 
of their counterparts, and move quickly to block the leakages.
In addition, the civil society in Cameroon has been critical 
of the agreements signed between the government and foreign 
partners such as China. Following the signing of a deal between 
Cameroon and China for the construction of roads and infrastruc-
ture like stadia and sports fields, the Chinese brought labour from 
their own country to execute these projects. The African Youth 
Diaspora Forum (AYDF) in Cameroon expressed its disappoint-
ment arguing that instead of employing Cameroonian youths, 
Chinese citizens came in to execute the contract thereby rendering 
Cameroonian youths unemployment. Accordingly to the spokes-
person of the AYDF Marie Tamoifo Nkom “Everyone was happy, 
first of all because Cameroon is in great need of sports facilities 
for the youth. Second of all, this project would mean job creation. 
Unfortunately, the latter did not happen as the Chinese brought 
[sic] their own labourers.” Still in Cameroon, over 30 CSOs recently 
called on the Cameroon government to give them a chance in the 
fight against illegal exploitation of forests in the country. They 
condemned the illegal exploitation of the country’s forests which 
was a source of the underdevelopment of the local communities. 
They argued that since the issue of illegal logging was a complex 
one, it was imperative for the civil society to join forces with the 
governing authorities to contribute towards a lasting solution. 
These CSOs asked to be involved in the legalisation process of 
forest exploitation and other forest products that are being expor-
ted and taken away from Cameroon to western countries (see in: 
<http://www.illegal-logging.info/item_single.php?it_id=1045&i-
t=news>). If these CSOs now express concerned about the illegal 
exploitation of the forest and other resources in Cameroon, it is a 
result of the hegemonic French and other companies which have 
vowed to keep the Cameroon forest to their exclusive control. This 
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is to the detriment of other competing countries of Europe and Asia 
and those communities that are blessed with the forest resources.
The criticisms levied against the ruthlessness of people like the 
Chinese goes beyond the Gulf of Guinea to include other African 
countries where the Chinese have an interest. In one of such 
scathing attack on the Chinese business concerns in Zambia, the 
Chairperson of the Zambian Civil Society Trade Network Stephen 
Muyakwa unequivocally stated that: 
Last year [2010], operations at a Chinese-
owned coal mine in the South of Zambia were 
suspended due to unsafe working conditions. 
Most labourers were half naked and did not 
have protective clothing, dust masks, hard 
hats or shoes. When a cabinet Minister at-
tempted to visit the mine, Chinese managers 
prevented her from doing so. They said it was 
‘their mine.’ In the end labourers were treated 
like animals. The mine was closed for a short 
while but then opened again.6
The Chairman of this trade network also cited an incidence 
which caused a stir in Zambia. This incidence was the death of 
50 Zambian miners in 2009 in an accident at an explosive factory. 
None of the Chinese employees got hurt which meant that Africans 
were exposed to very dangerous risks by their Chinese counterparts 
who would not do same. Similarly, the Chinese have employed 
the same business tactics in the Gulf of Guinea notably in Angola 
where they have a very strong presence.
Considering the impact of oil companies on the environment in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, several CSOs have added their 
voices to urgent measures aimed at providing a lasting solution to 
the complex problems of this region. For example, the international 
environmentalists from Friends of the Earth have joined the people 
of the Delta region to prosecute the oil companies so that they 
can account for the pollution and leaks from shell’s pipelines 
into farmlands and fishponds (CAMPBELL, 2010).There is also an 
increasing call from the PWYP for various companies to ‘publish 
what you pay’ and for governments of the Gulf of Guinea to 
6  See Mannak (s/a).
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‘publish what you earn.’ The national PWYP in Congo-Brazzaville 
and Nigeria are active in this call for their governments and the 
oil companies to publish what they earn and pay respectively 
(CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE…, 2011).
Similarly, a coalition of 22 Gabonese NGOs in 2007 criticised 
the country’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
and argued that there was a mismatch of $186 million between the 
figures provided by the government to the IMF and those provided 
by the EITI. In January 2008, the NGOs published a statement 
criticising the government’s use of oil revenues and were 
suspended by the government and an international outcry made 
the government of Gabon to back track and lift the suspension 
soon afterwards (see: <http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/
Ricardo_Soares_BBC_Oil_June_2008.pdf>). Although there is still a 
lot of foot-dragging in this direction, the more other civil society 
groups join in this call, the more things are likely to change for 
the better for all the people of the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, 
naturally endowed with a lot of human and natural resources.
Besides, there is a kind of civil society umbrella organisation 
still at its infancy. It is concerned with the welfare of the people of 
the Gulf of Guinea. This organisation is the Gulf of Guinea Citizens 
Network (GGCN) and brings together a diverse group of civil 
society organisations and actors working to protect community 
and citizens’ rights and the national interest in resource extraction, 
trade and governance in the Gulf of Guinea Commission countries 
namely Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Sao Tome e Principe. The 
activities of the GGCN are coordinated by the Social Action which 
is a Social Development Integrated Centre in Port Harcourt in 
Nigeria as well as the Citizens’ Governance Initiatives in Yaounde 
Cameroon.
If well-coordinated, the GGCN may become a very strong force in 
the near future as far as controlling the excesses of unrepresentative 
governments and the major exploratory companies that have 
invaded the Gulf of Guinea for badly needed resources for their 
home industries in Europe, America and Asia where China is a 
great consumer. A few decades ago, such initiative from within 
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the Gulf of Guinea could not have been envisaged considering the 
disruptive activities of the western countries and their companies 
as well as the destabilising influence of surrogate leaders. Now that 
such an initiative has seen the light of day when the exploitation 
of resources of the Gulf of Guinea are on-going with reckless 
abandon including also conflicts and suffering, there is a rising 
awareness among diverse civil societies to close ranks and protect 
the resources of the Gulf of Guinea from wanton exploitation. It is 
very likely that if the resource war between industrialised countries 
of the West and Asia remains the way it is now, these CSOs are 
likely to become more vocal sooner than later. 
5 THE GULF OF GUINEA IN THE FUTURE
Considering the present cacophony in resource exploitation, 
conflict and competition in the Gulf of Guinea, the negative 
consequences these have produced and the reaction of the CSOs, 
there is hope and need for a future that will most probably benefit 
the people and not a select few and companies that now operate in 
the region. One of thethings to do for a better future for this region 
will be to put in place an integrated energy system to facilitate the 
networking of existing energy production capacity, develop a new 
integrated energy infrastructure and develop a robust system for 
off-shore oil and gas development (IBIKUNLE et alli, 2010). This 
will strengthen the bargaining power of the Gulf of Guinea states 
in negotiating oil deals with foreign governments and companies. 
It will also facilitate the sharing of ideas and the adoption of a 
common policy towards all oil exploratory companies which will 
be people centred and not necessarily profit and profit driven at a 
huge human cost.
In order to minimise the risk of insecurity and instability and 
maximise the opportunities for peace and sustainable development, 
there is need for measures to be put in place that could ensure 
consistent dialogue, good governance and greater investment in 
human development in the region which is unfortunately lacking 
today. Since some of the problems of the Gulf of Guinea are 
because of competition between America and China, there is need 
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for these two super-powers to create an enabling political forum 
that would enhance serious respectful dialogue between them on 
the one hand andthe Gulf of Guinea states on the other. Besides, 
the Gulf of Guinea Commission which was established in 2006 to 
strengthen cooperation and consultation among member states to 
prevent, manage and resolve conflicts linked to the economic and 
commercial exploitation of natural resources within the region 
needs to include other influential oil consumers like China. There 
should be room for greater dialogue and cooperation so that peace 
and security can be assured and healthy competition promoted 
among the heavy energy consuming countries.
In order to avoid or minimise conflict, there is also need for an 
open and transparent oil bidding system in the states of the Gulf of 
Guinea. There should be mutually agreed oil policies and measures 
to respond to supply interruptions arising from domestic instability 
and trans-national crime like terrorism and the need to ensure that 
there is accountability in the oil industry in the region. If domestic 
stability is assured in the region, it will ensure regional security and 
development and by extension the energy security of oil consuming 
states. It should also be noted that since deprivation and poverty 
often fuel rebellion, processes and institutions of good governance 
need to be nurtured and strengthened in the states of the Gulf of 
Guinea (ONUOHA, 2010). It is imperative for African leaders to 
re-examine their priorities vis-à-vis the interest of the primordial 
regions so as to balance the political equation (EDO, 2010).
The CSOs should also be at the centre of an all-embracing 
policy that can benefit the ethnic groups located in the areas of 
resource abundance. A vibrant civil society network as the one 
that already exist, needs to rise above partisan, sectarian and other 
parochial interests to play the role of an arbiter in oil deals and 
secure better conditions for governments and citizens. Community 
based organisations (CBOs), NGOs and other civil society groups 
like the churches should be consulted more permanently and made 
to be signatory to treaties signed with oil companies. This will help 
to minimise risks and other concerns and create a convenient 
atmosphere for government, the local communities and firms 
operating in the region to be mutually helpful to one another.
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6 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In this study we haveexamined the attractiveness of the Gulf of 
Guinea in terms of its strategic location and abundance of human 
and natural resources. This has over the past six to seven centuries 
made world powers to scramble for these resources with the 
attendant hegemonic activities. This hegemonic competition in the 
Gulf of Guinea has been accelerated by the crisis in the Middle East 
and the increasing wave of ‘terrorist’ attacks and networks spread 
throughout the world. Apart from the need to secure America’s 
future energy needs, the US is also in the Gulf of Guinea to fight 
‘terrorism,’ promote democracy and good governance. The Chinese 
have come into the region with more ‘juicy’ offers and conditions 
which are less rigorous than those of the western countries. This 
has resulted in a kind of resource war and also increased piracy 
and other environmental problems in the region. This complex mix 
of problems and interests have led to the emergence of militant 
groups and more importantly civil society groups to mitigate the 
negative impact of hegemony. These groups are increasingly 
becoming critical of some of the activities of their governments 
and foreign firms. They have also offered to assist in the provision 
of solutions to some of the problems of their countries. Although 
these CSOs are being criticised for not doing enough to checkmate 
the excesses of these foreign interest groups, there are hopes that 
the future of these organisations will do more than they are doing 
now to defend the interest of their people and countries.
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